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LAW AND GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S.S.R.
By JULAN TOWSTER*
It is impossible to assess any aspect of the Soviet polity without keep-
ing in mind two things: (1) that only on the rarest occasions in the four
decades of Soviet existence has the reality of Soviet life corresponded to
official theory, and (2) that no event in the Soviet Union can be properly
evaluated without some knowledge of its background and context.
Soviet pronouncements of recent years have repeatedly emphasized the
claims that the post-Stalin regime has brought about a return to: (1)
"socialist legality," i.e., a guarantee of the citizens' rights and liberties, (2)
popular sovereignty, i.e., genuine participation by the people in the govern-
ance of the state, and (3) an entrenchment and enhancement of the status
and powers of the national entities of the Soviet federation. In order to
evaluate the validity of these claims we must examine-however cursorily
-the background and evolution of the Soviet approach to law, federalism,
and judicial functions, then consider the so-called "liberalizations" of the
Khrushchev period, and finally venture a glimpse into the future of law,
rights and justice in the U.S.S.R.
The Attitude Toward Law*
First, let us look at the Soviet approach to law, more precisely at the
current emphasis on the value of law and the imperative of "socialist legal-
ity" in the U.S.S.R. In point of fact, the emphasis on the utility and stabil-
ity of law is not new on the Soviet scene--it actually dates back to the mid-
thirties. What is new is the revival of this emphasis and especially its
coupling with statements for a renewal of "socialist legality" after Stalin's
death. Before 1937, that is for nearly 20 years of the Soviet regime, there
was a widespread negative attitude toward law in the U.S.S.R. Traditionally
the attitude of the Russian peasant toward law, lawyers and judges was one
of fear and hatred, as the Russian folk-sayings and proverbs amply testify.'
While the peasants venerated the Tsar, the "Little Father" who will some
day deliver them from the clutches of the landlords and bureaucrats, they
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1 Proverbs such as the following had wide currency among the peasant masses: "Show me
a scribe (a judge) and I will show you a crook;" 'His words are straight, but his fingers are
crooked?'
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despised the latter.' Generally a strong anarchistic strain ran in the Russian
character. Needless to say, for some time after the seizure of power the
Bolsheviks did nothing to make law and legality dearer to the masses. On
the contrary, Marxist theory generally spoke of both state and law as tools
of the exploiting, dominant classes, and it promised that the proletariat,
after it seized power and established its dictatorship, would lead society to
the abolition of all classes and with them to the "withering away" of the
institutions of state and law. Lenin himself spoke of the Soviet state as a
"semi-state" which was on the road to "withering away." The most promi-
nent Soviet legal thinkers took these "withering away" ideas quite seriously
and declared that the working class has no use for law, that it should take a
critical attitude not only toward the capitalist state, ethics and law, but to
the Soviet state, ethics and law. For example, Professor Stuchka, erstwhile
dean of Soviet jurists, declared in 1927 that communism means "not the
victory of socialist law, but the victory of socialism over any law," since law
will disappear when classes are abolished. Instead of such words as "crime"
and "punishment," Soviet criminal lawyers substituted such fanciful mouth-
fuls as "socially dangerous act" and "measure of defense." The judges,
most of whom were trained under the old regime, frantically sought the
sources and meaning of law in such formulas as "revolutionary legality,"
"revolutionary expediency," "socialist legality," "the socialist concept of
law," with the sad consequence that "law" and "legality" were utterly nebu-
lous and unstable terms in the semantics of Soviet society-concepts little
understood and little respected by the citizenry. More than that, while the
inauguration of the Five Year Plans made discipline and obedience to the
commands of the state a prime prerequisite for their success, and Stalin
warned in 1930 and 1933 that far from the "withering away" of the state,
"the highest development of governmental power" (which would obviously
mean of law also) was called for in the emerging future, most of the jurists
continued on their old and merry way. Their leading spokesman at that time,
Professor Pashukanis, told them that the "withering away" of the state
would become decisive in 1937, so some of these lawyers called for the abo-
lition of village councils, others for an end to the courts. The drafting of the
codes was delayed; the study of law was neglected.
If such views were not conducive to any respect for law, they required
clarification in any case by the late thirties, when it was officially stated that
the Soviet Union had entered the phase of "completing" the establishment
of a classless society. Such a clarification came in 1937-38 in the form of
thundering condemnations by Andrey Vyshinsky of all negative expressions
2 Their sufferings and privations under the Tsarist autocracy they blamed on the officials
and landlords. As for the lack of intervention by the Tsar in behalf of the people, the peasant
proverb explained: "The sun cannot shine everywhere, and the Tsar cannot be everywhere."
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concerning the form, content or viability of Soviet law. Vyshinsky de-
nounced Pashukanis and others as "legal nihilists" who were undermining
the might of the Soviet state, despite Stalin's call for the "stability of laws"
as a basis for "the durability of the state order... (and) state discipline."
Pashukanis and other prominent jurists disappeared in the purge that fol-
lowed. Once and for all condemning all predictions of the early extinction
of law, Vyshinsky called for the mastery of the study of law. Numerous new
law schools were opened and a terrific propaganda was unleashed enjoining
the citizens to respect and obey law as a necessary instrument of social con-
trol and vital necessity for the progress of the U.S.S.R. In short, obedience
to law became a virtue in Soviet society and the demand for "stability of
laws," a solemn promise of protection of the interests of the citizenry.
The question is: did this new and positive approach to law actually
guarantee the rights and liberties of the citizens? Did it mean acceptance of
the Rule of Law-recognition by the leaders of the supremacy of law over
rulers and ruled alike? Does the present official emphasis on law and "social-
ist legality" mean such recognition by Khrushchev and his colleagues?
The Question of Popular Sovereignty
The same question may be raised with regard to the new stress on
popular sovereignty in Soviet political semantics. Early in the regime Soviet
jurists-considering themselves good Marxists-poked fun at the concept
of popular sovereignty as a fiction of bourgeois jurisprudence designed to
hoodwink the masses and conceal the rift of society into antagonistic
classes and the dominance of the class of the bourgeoisie. In the Soviet
Union, wrote Professor Cheliapov in the Encyclopedia of State and Law,
the dictatorship of the proletariat took the place of popular sovereignty
"doing away with the illusory sovereignty of the entire nation, the entire
people." Professor Gurvich wrote that the Soviets "have in mind not the
people, a nebulous, indefinite, multicolored mass, but the dominant class:
the proletariat and toiling peasantry only." However, as the Soviet leaders
became increasingly aware of the value of suitable political semantics, and
in view of the fact that Stalin proclaimed in 1936 that there were no longer
any antagonistic classes in the Soviet Union, which had achieved socialism
and was marching toward Communism, the Soviet jurists changed their
tune. In such circumstances, Vyshinsky proclaimed there is no longer room
for the view that Soviet law was the will of the proletariat as the dominant
class: "the place of the class," said he, "is taken by the people, the toilers."
In the Soviet Union the people as a whole are now the sovereign of the land.
Hence, the new definition of law which he proposed reads as follows:
Socialist law of the epoch of conclusion of socialist construction and the
gradual transition from socialism to communism is a system of rules of
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conduct (norms) established in legislative order by the rule of the toilers
and expressing their will, the will of the entire Soviet people, which is led by
the working class headed by the Communist Party (Bolsheviks), for the
purpose of defending, strengthening, and developing socialist relations and
for the gradual construction of the communist society.
This definition prevails to this day. The question is: how much truth is there
in it? What proof do we have of popular sovereignty in the USSR? What
role-if any-do the people play either directly or through their elected
representatives in the making of laws in the USSR?
The Nature of the Union
Similar questions may be asked in regard to the nature of the federation
in the USSR. It must be remembered that, like Marx before him, Lenin
was a centralist, and prior to the Revolution he opposed federation on
principle. He was for a centralized, unitary state. If, nevertheless, from
1903 on he put into the Party platform the slogan of "self-determination
to the point of secession" for the nationalities of Old Russia, he did so for
psychological reasons, in order to make friends out of those embittered
nationalities, hoping all the time that when a proletarian state is proclaimed
in Russia these nationalities will not want to secede. When, however, in
1917-1918 the border nationalities began to set up their own states, anyway,
Lenin beat a hasty retreat and declared himself for federation. Thus, the
meager Russian territory held by the Bolsheviks in 1918 was designated as
the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic or RSFSR in the first Soviet
constitution. When, in December 1922, it was decided to unite the RSFSR
with the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Transcaucasia, the Bolshevik leaders
had before them three choices: (1) to name the association a "unitary state,"
i.e., one where the central authorities decide the division of powers between
the central and local agencies, or (2) to proclaim it a "confederation"
wherein the local entities decide what powers the central agencies of gov-
ernment shall have, or (3) to make the Union a federation, i.e., an associa-
tion wherein the distribution of power between the federal union and the
separate states is fixed in a written constitution which can be altered only
by the joint consent of both. The Soviet leaders-in the 1922-24 constitu-
tion and again in the 1936 constitution-emphatically proclaimed the Union
a federal state. Following the usual federal formula for uniting separate
sovereignties into a union, in which each yields certain powers to a common
authority and retains all others in local autonomy, article 14 of the con-
stitution reserves certain enumerated powers to the Federal Union, while all
residual powers remain in the constituent republics by article 15. The
supremacy of federal law is provided for, and while amendments of the
constitution need not be ratified by the Union Republics, the fact that both
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chambers of the federal Supreme Soviet must vote such amendments is
deemed sufficient to protect the Union Republics, since they are equally
represented in the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet the con-
stitution even contains several features which are normally found only in
confederations, not federations: it grants each Union Republic the right to
secede (article 17) and, since 1944 it even empowers the Union Republics
to enter into diplomatic relations with foreign states and to establish their
own military formations. Also, each of the Union Republics has a Deputy
Chairman on the federal Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which is con-
sidered the collective President of the U.S.S.R. And Soviet theoreticians
endlessly reiterate not only the sovereignty and independence of each of the
Union Republics but the "national autonomy" even of lower units in the
federation, such as the Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Regions, and
national areas. Again, the question is, what is truth and what is sham in
these provisions and assertions? How much was the individual or the local-
ity protected by these conceptions of law, sovereignty and federalism in
the Stalin era?
The Realities of the Soviet Polity
The answer to the questions raised above is that neither the elections
of the Soviets, nor the actual operation of the Soviet structure and judicial
system disclose any firm guarantees for the protection of the rights and
liberties of the individual and the locality or for significant citizen participa-
tion in the making of laws. The 1936 constitution provides for universal,
equal, direct and secret suffrage, but this outside shell of democratic form
has little substance, since the whole conception of the elections to the
Soviets-which are controlled by Party organs at every step-is that they
offer the Party a means for spotting potential talent for the vast bureauc-
racy and for arousing the populace to greater productive effort, while serv-
ing at the same time to convey a sense of participation in government. Since
only one candidate stands for election in each district, the nomination of
candidates-in which the Party plays the controlling influence-determines
the outcome in advance, and the elections themselves in which over a 99
per cent vote is rolled out become a ceremonial exercise in unanimity. The
citizen has the vote but not the choice, and the elections have come to be
accepted as a huge mass holiday.
The pyramid of Soviets thus elected-again guided and controlled at
every level by corresponding Party organizations-consists of some 60,000
odd local Soviets at the base, i.e., village (over 50,000), city (1600) and
borough (nearly 500) Soviets, with intermediate rungs of district (over
4000) and regional Soviets (9 autonomous Regions and 129 Regions),
which are topped by the Soviets of the 17 Autonomous Soviet Socialist
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Republics (ASSR), 15 Union Republics, and finally the central Soviet
organs of the USSR-the Supreme Soviet, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
and the Council of Ministers. It is these central organs which concern us
most in the question of law-making.
Who makes laws in the U.S.S.R.? And to what extent-if any-do they
express the sovereign will of the people? To begin with, we should note
that Soviet constitution-makers never recognized any need for separation
of powers. Steklov, the chairman of the commission which drew up the first
Soviet constitution, stated in 1918 that the Soviets will not follow the ex-
ample of bourgeois constitutions which "inspired by the doctrinarism of
the propertied classes.., make an artificial separation between the execu-
tive, the legislative and the judicial powers." The 1918 and 1924 constitu-
tions expressly ascribe both legislative and executive power to the then
existing Congress of Soviets, Central Executive Committee (C.E.C.), Pre-
sidium C.E.C., and Council of Ministers (then called Council of People's
Commissars). While the new constitution equally repudiated the separa-
tion of powers principle-asserting instead, in Vyshinsky's words, "the gen-
eral spirit of the unity of governmental power"-it nevertheless provided
for a strict division of functions which made the formal scheme of power
outwardly akin to the British parliamentary system, with a doctrine of
parliamentary supremacy and responsibility of the executive to the legis-
lature. The Soviet parliament-the Supreme Soviet-elected for a four-year
term and comprising at present a membership of 1,378-meets twice a year
for about a week at a time. It consists of two chambers with equal powers:
the Council of the Union-elected on the basis of one deputy per 300,000
people, and the Council of Nationalities-elected on the principle of nation-
ality on the basis of 25 deputies from a Union Republic, 11 from A.S.S.R.,
5 from an Autonomous Republic and one from a national area. The Soviet
constitution and constitutional theory emphasize endlessly that as the organ
of the sovereign people the Supreme Soviet is "the highest organ of the
state power in the U.S.S.R.," the source of all authority, possessed "ex-
clusively" of the legislative power of the Union.
The Supreme Soviet elects for four-year terms the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet or so-called "collective President"-a body of 33 which
serves as titular head of the U.S.S.R. and is empowered to issue decrees
and interpret laws in force-and also the Council of Ministers (now com-
posed of some 60 members) which is expressly designated by the constitu-
tion as the "executive and administrative organ." Both the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers are supposed to be responsible
and accountable to the Supreme Soviet. The decrees of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet must be submitted for confirmation by the Supreme Soviet,
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while the right of the Council of Ministers to issue decisions and orders-
Soviet theoreticians repeat times without number-can be exercised only
"on the basis of and in pursuance of the laws" of the Supreme Soviet (arts.
64-66). Thus, the official theory is one of exclusive law-making by the sov-
ereign organ of the people-the Supreme Soviet and subordination to it of
both the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers.
Practice, however, discloses an entirely different picture. While the theory
is that the Supreme Soviet represents the interests of the entire population
through the Council of the Union, and of the specific interests of the nation-
alities through the Council of Nationalities, the Supreme Soviet is in fact an
assemblage of the Soviet elite-a gathering of notables--coopted by the
Party summit and expressing the aims and interests of the Party. Not only
is it not the source of all authority, but it is itself an auxiliary instrument
of the Party summit, the 255 member Central Committee and especially
the 24 member Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party), which
benefits politically from the fact that the fiction of popular sovereignty and
of the Supreme Soviet as its supreme expression is maintained. The Supreme
Soviet is far from being the sole legislative organ even in a purely formal
sense, because even by official statistics it is amply clear that important
legal norms are passed in vastly greater numbers in the form of decrees of
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers decisions
and orders. While decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet require
approval by the Supreme Soviet, practice shows that many Presidium de-
crees on vital subjects (such as the June 1940 decree changing the consti-
tutionally provided (art. 119) seven-hour labor day to an eight-hour labor
day, or the October 1940 decrees on labor reserves and compulsory transfer
of engineers and foremen) are in effect many months before approval by
the Supreme Soviet and such approval is purely pro forma and unanimous
without discussion or debate. In point of fact, the greatest producer of legal
enactments binding throughout the U.S.S.R. is the Council of Ministers.
Yet such enactments are not submitted at all for confirmation by the
Supreme Soviet. For example, article 121 of the 1936 constitution provided
for free education, including higher education. But in 1940 the Council of
Ministers ordered tuition fees in colleges and higher grades of secondary
schools. The order became, of course, obligatory throughout the land and
only seven years later was the constitution amended to embody the change.
Still a third category of vital enactments which are nowhere provided for
in the constitution or laws, and which completely pass up the Supreme
Soviet are the joint resolutions of the Central Committee of the Party and
the Council of Ministers, which have been published from time to time since
1931 and bear orders to governmental bodies or public institutions directly
affecting the citizens.
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In sum, the Supreme Soviet, in theory the highest expression of popular
sovereignty, is a rubber stamp body whose existence enables the Commu-
nist leaders to claim periodic approval of their decisions by the so-called
"sovereign" organ of the people. It is merely one of several official Soviet
organs through which the will of the Party leaders-the decisions they
adopt-are given formal garb as either a law of the Supreme Soviet or a
decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet or an order of the Council
of Ministers, with-as is the case quite often-administrative acts changing
laws and on occasion even the constitution itself. This practice illuminates
clearly both the real nature of the legislative process and the tenor of Soviet
constitutionalism.
Similar illustrations are afforded by Soviet practice in the field of fed-
eralism. The communist leaders have promulgated numerous arrangements
to assure the centralization rather than dispersion of political authority.
Even on the purely formal side the powers granted by the constitution to
the Union are tremendous. They embrace not only basic principles and
direction in the field of foreign policy, but finance, trade, industry, agricul-
ture-in fact every important field. The industrial reorganization of May
1957 has not changed the fact that the entire economy is directed on the
basis of one unified plan, that even the budgets of the smallest localities are
part and parcel of the Union budget, while taxes, revenues and expenditures
are planned or confirmed and controlled from the federal center. The powers
reserved for the Union Republics are few, and on the basis of the all-per-
vading principle of "dual subordination" (which makes each level of admin-
istration subject to and subordinate to the level above it) even the exercise
of these few powers is supervised, directed and controlled from above by
the federal center. The federal Presidium of the Supreme Soviet can declare
null and void decisions of the Councils of Ministers of the Union Repub-
lics and the federal Council of Ministers can suspend such decisions. The
Procurator-General of the USSR has his own agents in every republic
responsible to him alone and completely independent of Union Republics
governments. And of course the most centralizing aspect is the operation of
the centralized, unitary Communist Party. The communist leaders have
shown little interest in observing constitutional niceties. To begin with, the
right of secession has always been pure fiction. In the purges of 1936-38
almost all the Premiers of the Union Republics were shot precisely because
of accusations that they wanted to detach the republics from the U.S.S.R.
The 1944 reform for separate diplomatic services and armies was never
meant to be seriously implemented and remains a dead letter. The boun-
daries of the Union Republics have been repeatedly altered without their
consent, and during the war the Chechen-Ingnsh, Kabardino-Balkar, Cri-
mean Tartar and Volga-German Autonomous Republics were dissolved
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and their populations deported wholesale. As Khrushchev himself stated
in his secret speech in February 1956, the only reason the Ukrainians es-
caped this fate is that "there were too many of them and there was no place
to which to deport them." Not only a Marxist-Leninist he concluded "but
also no man of common sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole
nations including women, children, old people, Communists and Konso-
mels responsible for inimical activity, to use mass repression against them,
and to expose them to misery and suffering for the hostile acts of individual
persons or groups of persons." To cap it all, there came in the postwar years
the ugly facet of Stalinist anti-semitism with the wanton extermination of
the Jewish cultural intelligentsia, removal of Jews from many fields of activ-
ity, and the infamous "Doctors Plot" in 1953 with the threat of wholesale
exile of the Jews to Siberia behind it. Thus, the so-called "federal solution"
in the U.S.S.R., which was supposed to serve as a beacon for the world in
solving the tangled problem of relations between nations, has turned out
to be in practice largely a delusion.
The System of Justice
Similar conclusions may be drawn with regard to the question of justice
for the Soviet citizen under the Soviet concept of "legality" and its applica-
tion by the judicial system in the Stalin era. According to the constitution
(art. 102) the system of justice in the U.S.S.R. is represented by (1)
Peoples Courts--elected by citizens of a district for a three-year period, (2)
the intermediate courts of territories, region and areas elected by their
Soviets for five-year terms, and (3) the Supreme Courts of Autonomous
Republics, Union Republics and the U.S.S.R.-each elected by its respec-
tive Supreme Soviet for a term of five years. Along with the judges, "people's
assessors" or lay judges are elected in regular judicial elections for ten
days annual service. Two such assessors sit with a judge in original trials
and are supposed to pass on both questions of fact and law along with him.
Outside of this formal structure, yet obviously a part of the system of jus-
tice in the broader sense of the word, are the so-called "comradely courts,"
Gosarbitrazh, i.e., administrative arbitration boards, and until September
1953 the Special Boards of the MVD (Secret Police). The comradely
courts are merely informal meetings of citizens in apartment houses, offices,
factories, or parks to settle disputes over petty injuries that arise among
citizens in such places. The "judges" can exact a small fine from the offender
who, however, can take the matter to a "people's court" if he feels aggrieved
by the decision. The MVD Special Boards were the exact opposite of the
"comradely courts" in the range of "justice" meted out. While in the com-
radely courts ordinary citizens assume a public role on single occasions of
minor offenses and function openly before the eyes of all present, the MV])
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Boards consisted of secret police officials, sitting in camera in supposedly
actual or potential serious political offenses. And the sentences they passed
out ranged from banishing the accused from a particular locality or the
country, to forced labor up to five years, or even the death penalty. In case
of the latter execution followed within 24 hours and there was no oppor-
tunity to appeal the sentence. The sentences of the MVD Boards were not
subject to interference by the courts. Only the Procurator General or his
representative could be present at sessions of an MVD Tribunal. If he felt
that an extreme injustice was being perpetrated he could appeal at once to
the highest Party leadership, but of course it would take a man of extra-
ordinary courage and of very high standing with that leadership to range
himself against the top hierarchy of the MVD.
In the ordinary courts there are only two stages for any case-the orig-
inal trial in a "People's Court" or one of an area, or region acting as a court
of original jurisdiction and then an appeal to the next higher court. Only
the Procurator General or his subordinates at the appropriate level can
protest the appellate decision to the Union Republic Supreme Court or in
extremely important cases to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court. As a rule, the
nature of the review consists of an examination of the record of the lower
court, but an independent examination of the evidence is not excluded if
the office of the Procurator General deems it necessary and introduces new
evidence. It should also be remembered that the President of the Supreme
Court can call up any case from any docket in the U.S.S.R. for examination
and review.
The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., designated as the "highest judicial
organ" in the land, consisted until February 1957 of 79 judges and 35
People's Assessors. It operated through five "collegia" or divisions: crim-
inal, civil, military, water transport and railroad transport, had original
jurisdiction in extremely important cases, such as high treason, and was
charged with the supervision of the judicial activities of all the courts in the
land. Appeals were heard in plenary sessions, which were also taken up with
the framing of instructions for the general practice and procedure of the
courts. The February 1957 reform eliminated the water and railroad trans-
port collegia, cut down the composition of the court without specifying its
membership,3 and directed that the Supreme Court should substantially re-
duce its supervisory functions in cases which have been considered by Union
Republic courts so that it may be able to concentrate attention on studying
and generalizing court practice and working out more carefully guiding
interpretations for the courts.
3 At present the Supreme Court consists of 12 judges-the Chairman or President, two
Deputy Chairmen and nine judges-and when a plenary session is held it comprises also the 15
Chief Justices of the Union Republic Supreme Courts. Thus the plenum consists of 27 judges.
Twenty People's Assessors are attached to this court.
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The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. has never possessed any powers of
judicial review. It cannot pass on the constitutionality of legislation or the
legality of acts of the Government. Even the function of interpreting laws
is given by the constitution not to the Supreme Court but to the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet. In fact, up to 1936 the Supreme Court was described
officially as being "attached" to the Central Executive Committee of the
Soviets. The new constitution omits such designation and declares that all
judges in the U.S.S.R. are "independent and subject only to law."
Last, but not least in the judicial system, is the Office of Procurator
General (or Attorney General). At first it was "attached" to the Supreme
Court of the U.S.S.R. and had no power over the procurators of the repub-
lics. Progressively, however, it became more and more centralized and
under the new constitution it is one of the most powerful organs of the
Soviet structure. The Procurator General is elected for a term of seven
years (longer than the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Court) and
he himself directly appoints the procurators of the republics and regions
and confirms those of lower rungs-all of whom are deemed his agents.
Soviet constitutional theory emphasizes his independence not only of the
Supreme Court but of the executive power and hierarchical influences. The
extraordinary prerogatives granted him by the constitution are embodied
in article 113 which reads: "Supreme supervisory power to ensure the strict
observance of the law by all Ministries and institutions subordinated to
them, as well as by officials and citizens of the U.S.S.R. generally, is vested
in the Procurator General of the U.S.S.R." In short, he is the watchdog of
legality in the Soviet polity.
Again the question may be posed: did this position of the Procurator
General and the system of justice as a whole safeguard the Soviet citizen
in his constitutional rights. The answer, punctuated for the whole world by
Krushchev's revelations concerning the monstrous crimes of the Stalin era,
is obvious enough. Where was Andrei Vyshinsky, the Procurator General
of the U.S.S.R., at the time the "guardian of legality," why didn't he stop
these crimes, not only against ordinary people, but against Central Com-
mittee members and even such Politbureau candidates as as Rudzutak,
Eikhe, Postyshev and others? The answer is simple enough. In the prevail-
ing conception of the judicial process, neither the judiciary nor the Pro-
curator General are outside of politics. Both, in Vyshinsky's own words,
are "carriers of the policy of the Communist Party" and the contents-and
form of their activities "cannot avoid being subordinated to political class
aims and striving." It was Stalin who controlled the Party and determined
its "alms and strivings," and Vyshinsky could not be anything but an obe-
dient tool. In such a concept on of the judiciary, the grandiose Bill of Rights
of the Soviet Constitution could not but remain a hollow mockery.
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The Liberalizations of the Post-Stalin Period
Thus we come to our final question: did the post-Stalin liberalizations
substantially change the outlook-can we now look forward to genuine
constitutionalism and the Rule of Law on the Soviet scene? On the whole,
it appears the answer must still remain in the negative.
To be sure, along with the economic-administrative reorganization of
1957, the inclusion of the Chief Justices of the Union Republics in the
Plenum of the Supreme Court U.S.S.R. and of the Premiers of the Union
Republics as ex officio members of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, are
gestures in the direction of the rights of the nationalities. And, what is far
more important, the liberalizations in the fields of law and justice consti-
tute positive steps forward.
These liberalizations can be summarized as follows:
1. Since March 1953 a number of amnesties freed prisoners with sen-
tences of five years or less, pregnant women, juvenile delinquents, overaged
and sick persons, and even some political prisoners.
2. In a series of trials against Stalin's terror apparatus the key leaders
of the Secret Police were shot, many others were replaced, the special MVD
Boards were abolished, and the Secret Police (now KGB) was definitely
subordinated to the Party and the Council of Ministers.
3. The regime of the forced labor camps was reformed. Prisoners were
allowed reduced terms for overfulfilling production norms, uniforms were
abolished, food was improved and visits by relatives were permitted. Many
camps were entirely abolished, while most of the others have been con-
verted into so-called "reeducation by labor colonies," i.e., the prisoners are
permitted to live with their families outside the camp grounds and are paid
for work as free laborers while remaining within the region.
4. Perhaps the brightest spot in this picture is the minimum security
prisons-such as Krukovd outside Moscow which so impressed Judge Leib-
owitz.' These are prisons without stone-wall fences, with wholesome food,
ordinary dress, time for study and recreation, opportunities to learn a trade,
pay equal to that of outside workers, permission for wives to visit with
their husbands several days each month in the prison's special quarters for
married couples, and lastly, in many cases, the complete expunging of a
man's criminal record upon release from prison.
5. Finally, on December 25, 1958, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.
adopted Basic Principles of new codes on Criminal Law and Criminal Pro-
cedure which will serve as a basis for new codes to be prepared by the
Union Republics. The new codes return to the traditional terminology of
"crime" and "punishment," define more precisely so-called "counterrevo-
4 See the article by Judge Leibowitz in Life, June 8, 1959.
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lutionary crimes," raise the age of responsibility for serious crimes from
12 to 14, reduce the maximum prison sentences for most crimes from 25
years to 10-15 years, and above all abolish the "rule of analogy," which-
contrary to the universally respected principle Nullum Crimen Nulla Poena
Sine Lege (an act is not a crime unless it is so specified by statute which
provides the penalty for it)-punished a man for an offense not covered by
law but merely resembling one defined by statute. Also, the death penalty
is no longer mandatory, but depends upon the decision of the court.
There is no doubt that these innovations spell a more humane approach.
But do they really signify complete justice for the citizen, and above all
do they portend a guarantee of stability for the constitutional rights of the
citizenry?
To begin with the New Code preserves a number of the old negative
features:
1. On the vital question of a presumption of innocence, it is so vague
that it straddles the fence.
2. The Pre-trial Investigation, which is conducted by investigators of
the public prosecutor or the secret police, or both, is retained. Under this
system, a citizen can be seized and held incommunicado without trial for
as long as nine months without any court warrant and without any right of
the court to intervene. While evidence is gathered against him and the case
prepared, the citizen can do nothing but wait.
3. While the New Code now allows defense counsel to see him in cus-
tody, the lawyer is entirely excluded from the pre-trial proceedings. Only
when the case is fully built and presented can he appear in court, and even
then he has no right to question the state's witnesses on his own. The as-
sumption is that the investigators were "objective" in the preliminary in-
vestigation. Generally, the position of "defense counsel" is rather anoma-
lous in Soviet courts and he often vies with the prosecutor in accusing the
defendant.
4. There is a basic inequality in the right of appeal between citizen and
prosecutor. The citizen can appeal only once-to the next higher court,
which will check whether the judgment is legal and well-based-and he
cannot appeal to the Federal Supreme Court. But the Procurator General
and his agents and the presidents of the higher courts can reopen any
closed case. A prosecutor can appeal a conviction if he thinks it is not harsh
enough, or even an acquittal until a year has elapsed. In all other cases
there is no time limitation.
5. One of the worst scourges of the Soviet system of justice was the lack
of publicity for most statutes, decrees, Council of Ministers decisions and
court proceedings. Even some of the recent liberalizing laws came to light
only slowly and indirectly because the Party leaders apparently preferred
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to hold certain measures ready for instant reversal. And this situation has
not been entirely remedied. Also, the powers of the MVD and KGB are
still not precisely defined.
6. Lastly, there is such a travesty on justice as the Law on Social Para-
sites in existence in seven of the republics, under which persons "who carry
on a parasitic mode of life.., as well as those living on unearned income"
may be exiled to from two to five years of forced labor by a committee of
one's neighbors, a decision which becomes final on approval of the local
Soviets. No judicial body takes part in such banishment. Indicative of the
distance between Soviet and Western democratic conceptions of justice is
the fact that while Justice Leibowitz calls this "drumhead justice, many
times more dangerous and primitive than the evils it is designed to punish,"
Soviet Procurator General Rudenko considers it "a matter of communal
welfare . . . not a criminal matter," and Supreme Court Justice Smirnov
defended it in similar terms."
Conclusions
Thus, the basic criterion of the efficacy of law and rights in the U.S.S.R.
is still the fundamental Soviet view of justice and its relation to the political
process. Many articles of the New Codes contain definitions of individual
crimes which are either very broad (for example, the flight or refusal to
return from abroad is defined as treason, punishable by a sentence of 15
years or the death penalty), or are phrased in a loose manner and non-legal
language. There is no guarantee against a too broad interpretation of the
articles of the codes under changes in the political climate. Should such
changes take place, there is nothing in the political philosophy of the pres-
ent leaders to hold them back from the full application of violence and the
denial of individual rights. Taking issue with Bukharin's statement (1923)
that "Revolutionary legality means an end to any arbitrary administration;
including the revolutionary," Vyshinsky declared: "In a proletarian state,
every measure-regardless of whether it is 'legal' or 'extraordinary'-has
as its source the dictatorship of the proletariat." The proletarian dictator-
ship is itself "the highest law," defining the concrete content of all and every
law. It is what Lenin called it: "A power not limited by any laws, not re-
strained by any absolute rules, resting directly on force." 6 The dictatorship
employs both laws and extraordinary administrative measures. Law is one
of its means of struggle, a method of the dictatorship. Consequently, judges
and jurists must always look at a law from the standpoint of whether or not
it answers the needs of the revolution, rather than stress the wording or legal
5 Ibid.
6 VYsENSKY, REVOIXUTSIONNAIA ZAxONNOST' NA SovmmENNo ETAPE 51, 52, 55 (Moscow
1933).
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formula of the law. "The formal law is subordinate to the law of the Revo-
lution," Vyshinsky concluded. "There might be collisions and discrepan-
cies between the formal commands of laws and those of the proletarian
revolution.... The collision must be solved only by subordination of the
formal commands of law to those of Party policy.
' 7
Despite some recent criticism of Vyshinsky this is still the dominant
view of Soviet jurisprudence. While limited justice-applying to ordinary
matters which involve neither basic policy, nor the security or prestige of
the leaders, nor current expediential needs-exists in the U.S.S.R., the
Rule of Law is still a long ways off. Although it is termed the "supreme
law of the land," the constitution is not an absolute or firm charter of rights
and liberties, and constitutionalism is still a fiction in the U.S.S.R. In the
Soviet state, Party fiat is the law above the law. Unlike constitutions else-
where, the Soviet constitution does not hold the Government to the consti-
tutionally enumerated powers. And the Party itself, which controls the
Government, is not subject to any laws-the constitution does not bind or
restrict the highest Party leadership. This leadership assumes that it must
have unlimited political power during the period of transition to commu-
nism, and that it alone must remain the ultimate judge of the limits and
priorities of all rights and liberties in the U.S.S.R. This makes of the Soviet
regime a "Government of Men" and not a "Government of Laws." Under
such a government law, rights, and liberties can be no more than conditional
quantities wholly dependent upon political expediency and the reading of
the barometers of the internal and external balances of power by the Com-
munist leaders.
7 VysmIINsy, SuDOusmoIsmVo v SSSR 24 (Moscow 1936).
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